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Over the years, in the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) determining 
the availability of family reunification rights for migrant Member State nationals, the 
pendulum has swung back and forth, from a „moderate approach‟ in cases such as 
Morson and Jhanjan (1982) and Akrich (2003), towards a more „liberal approach‟ in 
cases  such  as  Carpenter  (2002)  and  Jia  (2007).    Under  the  Court‟s  „moderate 
approach‟,  family  reunification  rights  in  the  context  of  the  Community‟s  internal 
market policy are only granted in situations where this is necessary for enabling a 
Member State national to move between Member States in the process of exercising 
one of the fundamental freedoms;  in other words, where there is a sufficient link 
between the exercise of one of the fundamental freedoms and the need to grant family 
reunification rights under EC law.  Conversely, under the Court‟s „liberal approach‟, 
in order for family reunification rights to be bestowed by EC law it suffices that the 
situation  involves  the  exercise  of  one  of  the  fundamental  freedoms  and  that  the 
claimants  have  a  familial  link  which  is  covered  by  the  Community‟s  secondary 
legislation: there is no need to illustrate that there is a link between the grant of such 
rights and the furtherance of the Community‟s aim of establishing an internal market.  
The  recent  Eind  and  Metock  judgments  (and  the  Sahin  order)  have  shifted  the 
pendulum  towards  the  „liberal  approach‟  side  by  making  it  clear  that  it  is  not 
necessary a) that the family members of migrant economic actors have been lawfully 
resident in another Member State, prior to their move to the host State where they 
accompany or join the migrant; or b) (according to Metock and Sahin) that they have 
been family members of the migrant economic actor at the time that that person had 
exercised his freedom to move.   
 
In this paper it will be explained that the fact that the EU is aspiring to be not only a 
supranational  organisation  with  a  successful  and  smoothly-functioning  market  but 
also a polity the citizens of which enjoy a number of basic rights which form the core 
of a meaningful status of Union citizenship, is the major driving force behind this 
move.    In  particular,  the  move  towards  a  wholehearted  adoption  of  the  „liberal 
approach‟ seems to have been fuelled by a desire, on the part of the Court, to respond 
to a number of problems arising from its „moderate approach‟ and which appear to be 
an anomaly in a Citizens‟ Europe.  These are: a) the incongruity caused between the 
(new) aim of the Community of creating a meaningful status of Union citizenship and 
the  treatment  of  Union  citizens  (under  the  Court‟s  „moderate  approach‟)  as  mere 
factors of production; and b) the emergence of reverse discrimination.  The paper will 
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conclude with an explanation of why the adoption of the Court‟s liberal approach 
does not appear to be a proper solution to these problems.   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over  the  years,  in  the  Court‟s  case-law  determining  the  availability  of  family 
reunification rights under European Community (EC) law, the pendulum has swung 
back and forth from a „moderate approach‟ in cases such as Morson and Jhanjan
1 and 
Akrich,
2  towards  a  more  „liberal  approach‟  in  cases  such  as  Carpenter
3  and  Jia.
4  
Under the Court‟s „moderate approach‟, family reunification rights in the context of 
the Community‟s internal market policy are only granted in situations where this is 
necessary for enabling a Member State national to move between Member States in 
the process of exercising one of the fundamental freedoms.  Conversely, under the 
Court‟s „liberal approach‟, in order for family reunification rights to be bestowed by 
EC law, it suffices that a situation involves the exercise of one of the fundamental 
freedoms
5 and that the claimants have a familial link  with a migrant Union citizen 
which is covered by the Community‟s secondary legislation
6 - in other words, there is 
no  need  to  show  that  there  is  a  link  between  the  grant  of  such  rights  and  the 




8 judgments (and the Order in Sahin
9) have shifted the 
pendulum  towards  the  „liberal  approach‟  side  by  making  it  clear  that  it  is  not 
necessary that the family members of migrant economic actors have been lawfully 
resident in another Member State, prior to their move to the host State where they 
                                                 
1   Joined Cases 35-36/82, Morson and Jhanjan v Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723. 
2   Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607. 
3   Case C-60/00, Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279. 
4   Case C-1/05, Yunying Jia v Migrationsverket [2007] ECR I-1. 
5   In this paper, the term „fundamental freedoms‟ will be used to refer only to the free movement 
of economically active persons provisions of the Treaty (i.e. Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC), and 
not  to  Article  18  EC  which  governs  the  free  movement  of  economically  inactive  Union 
citizens.  The ECJ itself appears to have made this distinction in its case-law (even though 
Article 18 EC is considered to be one of the fundamental freedoms in broad terms – see 
section 1 on page 2 of the Commission‟s Report on the application of Directive 2004/38 on 
the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, COM (2008) 840/3).  See, for example, Case C-158/07, 
Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, Judgment of 18 November 2008, 
not yet reported, para 37; Case C-403/03, Schempp v Finanzamt München, [2005] ECR I-
6421, para 18; Joined Cases C-11 and 12/06, Morgan and Bucher, [2007] ECR I-9161, para 
23. 
6   The categories of family members that have an automatic right to accompany or join the 
migrant in the host Member State can be found in Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their fa mily members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L158/77. 
7   Case C-291/05, Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v R. N. G. Eind, [2007] ECR 
I-10719.  
8   Case C-127/08, Metock and others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Judgment 
of 25 July 2008, not yet reported. 
9   Case C-551/07,  Sahin v Bundesminister für Inneres, Order of 19 December 2008, not yet 
reported.   2 
accompany or join the migrant; or (according to Metock and Sahin) that they have 
been family members of the migrant economic actor at the time that that person had 
moved to the host State.   
 
It will be explained that the fact that the EU is aspiring to be, not only a supranational 
organisation with a successful and smoothly-functioning market, but also a polity the 
citizens of which enjoy a number of basic rights which form the core of a meaningful 
status of Union citizenship, is the major driving force behind this move.  In particular, 
the move towards a wholehearted adoption of the „liberal approach‟ seems to have 
been fuelled by a desire, on the part of the Court, to respond to a number of problems 
arising  from  its  „moderate  approach‟  and  which  appear  to  be  an  anomaly  in  a 
Citizens‟ Europe.  These are a) the incongruity caused between the (new) aim of the 
Community of creating a meaningful status of Union citizenship and the treatment of 
Union citizens (under the Court‟s „moderate approach‟) as mere factors of production; 
and b) the emergence of reverse discrimination.  The paper will conclude with an 
explanation of why the adoption of the Court‟s liberal approach does not appear to be 
a proper solution to these problems. 
   
 
II.  FAMILY REUNIFICATION RIGHTS UNDER EC LAW: THE 
‘MODERATE’ AND THE ‘LIBERAL’ APPROACHES 
 
Since the very early days of the Community‟s existence, the importance of ensuring 
that the family members of migrant Member State nationals are given certain rights 
(including family reunification rights) which are necessary for ensuring that the right 
to  free  movement  of  the  migrant  is  not  deprived  of  all  useful  effect,  has  been 
recognised.
10  This „tradition‟ has been carried forward throughout the decades and, as 
will be explained in this section, has been bolstered, and to a certain extent exceeded 
its four corners, in the last decade or so.   
 
The family reunification rights „saga‟ of the Court can be broadly divided into two 
„groups‟ which follow two different approaches.  On one end of the spectrum lies 
what I call the „moderate approach‟ to the bestowal of family reunification rights, 
followed by the Court in cases such as Morson and Jhanjan
11 and Akrich.
12  On the 
other end of the spectrum, we have case-law which comprises the group characterised 
by a more liberal approach towards the conferral of family reunification rights (the 
„liberal approach‟).  The most characteristic case of this latter group is the much-
criticised Carpenter judgment of 2002,
13 however, the  „liberal approach‟ seems to 
have been followed in all of the latest cases before the ECJ (Jia, Eind, Metock and 
Sahin)
14 and, therefore, it appears that the Court has (implicitly) decided to now adopt 
                                                 
10   G. Barrett, „Family matters: European Community Law and third-country family members‟, 
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 369, 375-376.  This was also mentioned by the Court 
in Carpenter, n 3 supra, para 38. 
11   N 1 supra. 
12   N 2 supra. 
13   N 3 supra. 
14   N 4 supra; n 7 supra; n 8 supra; n 9 supra, respectively. 
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this approach to the bestowal of family reunification rights.  As will be explained, it is 
not crystal clear to which group the Singh
15 case was intended to belong, since this 
depends on the actual interpretation of that judgment and, as can be deduced from 
recent case-law (Akrich, Jia and Eind), this is a territory where great ambiguity still 
lurks.   
 
A  The ‘moderate approach’ 
Starting  with  the  „moderate  approach‟,  this  is  evident  in  cases  where  the  Court 
required that the grant of family reunification rights was necessary for enabling a 
Member  State  national  to  move  between  Member  States  and  exercise  one  of  the 
fundamental  freedoms.
16  This  approach  wa s  starkly  illustrated  in  Morson  and 
Jhanjan where the Court, applying the purely internal rule established in the Saunders 
case,
17  held that  Dutch nationals  of Surinam origin,  who had lived and worked 
throughout their whole lives in the Netherlands, did not derive an automatic right 
from EC law to be accompanied by their Surinamese mothers in the Netherlands.  The 
reason behind this has, apparently, been that on the facts, the refusal to bestow a right 
of residence on the Surinamese women would in no way impact on the exercise  by 
their children  of one of the fundamental freedoms.     Hence, in  Morson  the  Court 
established  that  Member  States  are  not  required  by  EC  law  to  grant  family 
reunification rights in situations falling outside the scope of EC law because they are 
unrelated to the aims of the Treaty, and thus, in such instances, the fate of the right of 
residence of the family members of Member State nationals depends, entirely, on the 
national laws of the Member State on the territory of which a right of residence is 
claimed.  This absolutely rational approach often gives rise to the problem of reverse 
discrimination
18 since the immigration laws of most Member States are (often) more 
difficult to satisfy than the EC provisions which provide an automatic right to family 
reunification in situations falling within the scope of the free movement provisions.
19 
 
In order to proceed with the other major „moderate approach‟ judgment, we need to 
take  a  chronological  leap  forward  and  travel  from  1982,  when  the  Morson  and 
Jhanjan case was decided, to 2003 and the Akrich case.  Akrich is, to its greatest 
part,
20  a rationalising judgment.  There, the Court conf irmed that a national of a 
                                                 
15   Case  C-370/90,  The  Queen  v  Immigration  Appeal  Tribunal  and  Surinder  Singh,  ex  parte 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [1992] ECR I-4265. 
16   As Advocate General Tesauro has very rightly observed in his Opinion in  Singh, „the simple 
exercise of the right of free movement within the Community is not in itself sufficient to bring 
a particular set of circumstances within the scope of Community law; there must be some 
connecting factor between the exercise of the right of free movement and the right relied on by 
the individual‟ (paragraph 5 of the Advocate‟s General Opinion in Singh, ibid). 
17   Case 175/78, R v Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, para 11. 
18   See paragraphs 53-57 of the Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Carpenter, n 3 supra.  
For a detailed study on the problem of reverse discrimination in EC law see A. Tryfonidou, 
Reverse Discrimination in EC Law (Kluwer Law International, 2009).   
19   Paragraphs 26 and 33 of the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in  Jia, n 4 supra.  For a 
recent study on reverse discrimination in the context of family reunification in the EC see A. 
Walter, Reverse Discrimination and Family Reunification (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008).   
20   Although Akrich is considered to be a rationalising judgment as regards the Court‟s approach 
towards the bestowal of family reunification rights, nonetheless, the same does not hold true 
for the Court‟s approach in that judgment towards the scope of application of EC human rights 
protection.  There the Court, after finding that Mr Akrich did not derive from EC law a right to   4 
Member State who returns to his State of nationality may be able to rely on EC law 
against  that  State  in  order  to  claim  a  right  of  residence  for  his  family  members.  
However, according to the Court, a right of family reunification in the territory of the 
destination State (whether this be the State of nationality of the migrant Member State 
national or any other Member State) must only be granted, by virtue of EC law, if the 
family member had been lawfully resident in the territory of a Member State from 
which she moved together with the migrant Member State national to the territory of 
the State where a right of residence is claimed.  The reason behind this condition of 
prior lawful residence within the territory of the EU is obvious: if the aim of the grant 
of family reunification rights is, purely, to enable Member State nationals to move 
freely  between  Member  States,  the  refusal  of  such  rights  can  be  considered  as 
impeding  that  movement  only  if  a  Member  State  national  who  was,  previously, 
residing lawfully with his family members in the territory of one Member State will, 
as a result of his movement to another Member State, lose the right to live together 
with  his  close family members.   Conversely, if no such right  was  enjoyed in the 
territory of the State from which the migrant moved, then it seems that the refusal of a 
right  of  residence for  family members in  the  receiving State would  not  have any 
impact on the exercise of the freedom to move and thus would not have a sufficient 
link with the economic aims of the fundamental freedoms.
21  
 
B    The ‘liberal approach’ 
In the cases of Jia and Carpenter the Court of Justice seems to have followed a more 
liberal approach by (implicitly) accepting that EC law may require the grant of family 
reunification rights even in situations when this is not necessary for, and in any way 
linked to, the exercise of free movement from one Member State to another. 
 
Mr  Carpenter  was  a  British  national  who  was  providing  services  to  persons 
established  in  other  Member  States,  whilst  retaining  his  permanent  residence  and 
business in the UK.  The problems for Mr Carpenter began when his Philippines 
national  wife  applied  for  a  permanent  residence  permit  in  the  UK.  The  British 
authorities refused to grant Mrs Carpenter a residence permit on the ground that she 
did not satisfy the requirements of the UK legislation on the issue; and they issued a 
deportation order against her.  When the issue reached the Court of Justice, the Court 
held that Article 49 EC required the UK to give the right to Mrs Carpenter to reside 
on its territory together with her husband as otherwise the latter‟s right to provide 
services to persons established in the territory of another Member State would be 
impeded.
22  As argued elsewhere, this was clearly a case where the grant of family 
reunification rights was not, in any way , necessary  for enabling a Member State 
                                                                                                                                            
family reunification in the UK, went on to note that when the relevant Member State would be 
making its assessment regarding the issue of whether family reunification rights should be 
granted under national law, it should have regard to the need to respect for the right to family 
life of those persons which is „among the fundamental rights which […] are protected in the 
Community legal order‟ (Akrich, n 2 supra, para 58).  In this way, the Court extended the 
scope of application of human rights that are protected as general principles of EC law, to 
situations that fall outside the scope of EC law.  For a criticism of this part of the Court‟s 
judgment in Akrich see C. Schiltz, „Akrich: A clear delimitation without limits‟, (2005) 12(3) 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 241, 250-251.    
21   Akrich ibid paras. 50-54. 
22   Carpenter, n 3 supra, para 39.   5 
national to exercise an inter-state economic activity.
23  How can it be said that Mr 
Carpenter would cease travelling to other Member States in order to provide services 
(or, even more extraordinarily, stop pro viding services from the UK   to persons 
established in other Member States), just because his wife was not given a right to 
reside in the UK?  Mr Carpenter was not confronted with the dilemma of either not 
exercising his freedom to provide services and maintaining the right to reside with his 
wife, or exercising that freedom and, as a result of that, losing that right.
24  The Court 
has, therefore, been castigated for its judgment  in Carpenter for creating a situation 
whereby the limits of application of EC law have become incredibly uncertain.
25   
 
A very similar approach was followed by the Court subsequently in the Jia judgment.  
There, the failure of the host Member State (Sweden) to grant family reunification 
rights  to  the  Chinese  mother-in-law  of  a  German  national  who  had  moved  from 
Germany to its territory in order to exercise her freedom of establishment eight years 
before, did not seem capable of interfering with the exercise of the latter‟s freedom.  
Yet, the Court held that Ms Jia was entitled, under EC law, to be granted the right to 
accompany her daughter-in-law in Sweden.  The main difference from Carpenter is 
that the State where the right of residence was claimed by the third country national, 
was not the State of nationality of the migrant worker.  However, like in Carpenter, in 
Jia there was not a link between the failure to grant family reunification rights and a 
deterrent  effect  on  the  exercise  of  inter-state  movement  in  furtherance  of  the 
Community‟s (economic) aims.  How can it be said that a person who has exercised 
her freedom to move and establish business in the territory of another Member State, 
would be deterred if her mother-in-law from a non-EU country was not allowed to 
come  directly  to  join  her  in  the  host  Member  State  eight  years  after  that  initial 
movement?
26   
 
Hence, it seems that under this „liberal approach‟,
27 the mere proof of the existence of 
the requisite family link ,  together with the exercise of  some kind of  inter-state 
movement,  suffices  for  the  bestowal  by  the  Treaty  free  movement  of  persons 
provisions of automatic family reunification rights on third-country nationals and their 
Member State national family members.
28   
                                                 
23  See A. Tryfonidou, „Jia or “Carpenter II”: The edge of reason‟, (2007) 32 European Law 
Review 908, 914-915. 
24   For commentators characterising  the  Court‟s  reasoning  in  Carpenter  as  „artificial‟  see  S. 
Acierno, „The Carpenter Judgment: Fundamental Rights and the Limits of the Community 
Legal  Order‟,  (2003)  28(3)  European  Law  Review  398;  N.  Reich  and  S.  Harbacevica, 
„Citizenship and Family on Trial: A Fairly Optimistic Overview of Recent Court Practice with 
regard to Free Movement of Persons‟, (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 615, 628.  For 
an excellent explanation of why there was not a real link with EC law in Carpenter see L. 
Woods, Free Movement of Goods and Services within the European Community (Ashgate, 
2004), 224. 
25   N. Foster, „Family and  welfare rights in Europe: the impact of recent European Court of 
Justice decisions in the area of the free movement of persons‟, (2003) 25(3) Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law, 291, 297. 
26   See the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Jia, n 4 supra, paras. 70-71. 
27   Other cases which can be included in this group are Case C -459/99,  MRAX v  État belge 
[2002] ECR I-6591; and Case C-157/03, Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-2911. 
28   For an analysis the problems that are caused as a result of the application of the Court‟s 
„liberal approach‟ see A. Tryfonidou, „Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations:   6 
C    The Singh dilemma 
The discussion brings us now to the controversial case of Singh, a case capable of two 
different  interpretations  which  have  divided  commentators.    Depending  on  the 
interpretation adopted, Singh can been characterised as a „good‟ or a „bad‟ decision.   
 
It should be recalled that the Singhs got married in the early 1980s and were lawfully 
residing in the UK.  Mr Singh was an Indian national and Mrs Singh was a British 
national.  In 1983, the Singhs moved to Germany where Mrs Singh was employed (ie 
she was a „worker‟ within the meaning of Article 39 EC).  After a couple of years in 
Germany, the Singhs decided to return to the UK, where Mrs Singh established a 
business.  When Mr Singh applied to the UK authorities for a residence permit, the 
latter rejected his application.  The issue was then referred to the ECJ where it was 
pointed out: 
 
A national of a Member State might be deterred from leaving his country of 
origin in order to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed person 
[...] in the territory of another Member State if, on returning to the Member 
State  of  which  he  is  a  national  in  order  to  pursue  an  activity  there  as  an 
employed or self-employed person, the conditions of his entry and residence 
were not at least equivalent to those which he would enjoy under the Treaty or 
secondary law in the territory of another Member State. 
 
He would in particular be deterred from so doing if his spouse and children 
were not also permitted to enter and reside in the territory of his Member State 
of  origin  under  conditions  at  least  equivalent  to  those  granted  them  by 
Community law in the territory of another Member State.
29     
 
These paragraphs have been interpreted by most commentators as stating that the 
refusal to bestow on Mr Singh a right to reside wit hin the territory of the UK would 
deter Mrs Singh from moving in the first place  from the UK to Germany.
30  This 
interpretation of the case will hereinafter be referred to as „Interpretation I‟ of Singh. 
Such an interpretation, obviously, makes Singh a bad decision.  When the Singhs got 
married and lived in the UK, Mr Singh‟s right of residence in the UK was governed 
by UK law.  When Mr Singh returned to the UK with Mrs Singh, his right was, again, 
governed  by  UK  law.    Therefore,  the  movement  of  the  Singhs  from  the  UK  to 
Germany did not have any (negative) impact on Mr Singh‟s right of residence in the 
UK.  Mr Singh‟s position was exactly the same as would have been, had Mrs Singh 
remained confined within the territory of the UK and had not moved to Germany in 
order to work.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
An Incongruity in a Citizens‟ Europe‟, (2008) 35(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 43, 
52-53. 
29   Paras 19-20 of the judgment in Singh, n 15 supra. 
30   See M. Poiares Maduro, „The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal 
Situations and Reverse Discrimination‟ in C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. Skidmore (Eds.), 
The Future of European Remedies (Hart, 2000), 124-125; N. Nic Shuibhne, „Free movement 
of persons and the wholly internal rule: Time to move on?‟, (2002) 39 Common Market Law 
Review 731, 744-748; L. Woods, n 23 supra, at 225.  This appears also to be the view of 
Advocate General Stix-Hackl in her Opinion in Carpenter, n 3 supra, para 66.   7 
On the other hand, some other commentators, taking into account the specific facts of 
the  case,  have  been  of  the  view  that  the  Court‟s  judgment  in  Singh  allows  for  a 
different  interpretation  („Interpretation  II‟  of  Singh).
31  According to  them,  if Mr 
Singh was refused the right to reside in the UK following Mrs Singh‟s return to the 
UK, Mrs Singh would be deterred from moving from Germany back to the UK in 
order to exercise her freedom of establishment.
32  If this interpretation is accepted, 
then Singh falls within the „moderate approach‟ since it becomes clear that if Mrs 
Singh knew that, on her return to the UK, she would lose the right she enjoyed in 
Germany of living with her husband, then it is highly likely that she would decide not 
to exercise her freedom to move from Germany back to her State of nationality in 
order to pursue a self-employed activity there.  This interpretation seems to have been 
adopted, also, in the Akrich judgment where the Court examined whether the right of 
Mrs Akrich to return from Ireland to the UK (her State of nationality) in order to 
work, would be deterred as a result of the refusal of the UK authorities to allow Mr 
Akrich the right to reside in the UK.
33 
 
D    Eind, Metock and Sahin: Moving towards the ‘liberal approach’  
The recent judgments of the Court in Eind and Metock (and its order in Sahin) appear 
to have decidedly moved the pendulum towards the „liberal approach‟ side.  Any 
considerations that the previous cases which are representative of this approach may 
have just been confined to their own facts, have now been removed.  The Court has 
made it clear through its reasoning that, provided that a situation involves the exercise 
by a Union citizen of one of the fundamental freedoms and a family member who 
falls within one of the categories provided by secondary legislation, a sufficient link 
with EC law exists and thus the family member can automatically accompany or join 
the migrant in the host State, without any additional conditions being imposed by that 
State.     
(i)  Eind 
In February 2000 Mr Runaldo Eind, a Dutch national, left the Netherlands and went to 
the UK in order to work.  He was subsequently joined by his 11-year-old daughter 
Rachel,  a  national  of  Surinam,  who  joined  him  directly  from  her  country  of 
nationality.  The UK authorities informed Mr Eind that, as a migrant worker, he had a 
right to reside in the UK by virtue of Regulation 1612/68,
34 and, at the same time, his 
daughter was informed that she also had, under the same legislation, a right to reside 
in the UK in her capacity as a member of the family of a Community worker.  In 
October 2001, Mr Eind returned to the Netherlands and Rachel joined him there.  In 
the Netherlands, Mr Eind was not engaged in any economic acti vity nor was he 
actively looking for a job.  The Dutch State Secretary for Justice  refused to issue a 
residence permit for Rachel  pointing out that she did not derive a ny rights from EC 
                                                 
31   See, for example, G. Barrett, n 10 supra, at 379.  White appears to be of the view that the 
Court‟s judgment can accommodate both interpretations – see R. C. A. White, „A fresh look at 
reverse discrimination‟, (1993) 18(6) European Law Review 527. 
32   This was also the view of Advocate General Tesauro in his Opinion in the  Singh case (n 15 
supra).    Paragraph  21  of  the  Judgment  in  Singh  may  also  be  used  in  support  of  this 
interpretation. 
33   Akrich, n 2 supra, paras. 47-48.  See C. Schiltz, n 20 supra, at 247.     
34   Regulation 1612/68/EEC on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, [1968] 
OJ L257/2.   8 
law as a family member of her father since her father was neither a „worker‟ within 
the meaning of Article 39 EC nor a (economically inactive) Union citizen that fell 
within the scope of EC law.  Therefore, the Dutch court hearing the case referred a 
number of questions to the ECJ which, in effect, asked whether Rachel had a right 
deriving from EC law to remain in the Netherlands as a family member of her father. 
 
The  Court  held  that  Rachel  had  a  right  under  EC  law,  and  in  particular  the  free 
movement of workers provisions, to accompany her father in the Netherlands and 
reside there.  In the main part of its reasoning, the Court employed the „deterrence 
principle‟ which was firstly applied in the Singh case.  The Court began its analysis by 
explaining that 
  
the right of the migrant worker to return and reside in the Member State 
of  which  he  is  a  national,  after  being  gainfully  employed  in  another 
Member State, is conferred by Community law, to the extent necessary to 
ensure the useful effect of the right to free movement for workers under 
Article 39 EC and the provisions adopted to give effect to that right, such 
as those laid down in Regulation 1612/68. […].
35   
 
The Court then moved on to explain this in more detail and pointed out in paragraphs 
35 and 36 of its judgment that: 
  
[a]  national  of  a  Member  State  could  be  deterred  from  leaving  that 
Member State if he does not have the certainty of being able to return to 
his  Member  State  of  origin,  irrespective  of  whether  he  is  going  to 
engage in economic activity in the latter State.  That deterrent effect 
would also derive simply from the prospect, for that same national, of 
not being able, on returning to his Member State of origin, to continue 
living together with close relatives, a way of life which may have come 
into being in the host Member State as a result of marriage or family 
reunification.   
 
Finally, the Court provided the clarification (though, in view of the lack of clarity of 
this part of the judgment, this appears to be an oxymoron) that the right of residence 
to which Rachel is entitled by virtue of EC law is not affected by the fact that, before 
residing in the host Member State, Rachel did not have a right of residence, under 
national law, in the Member State of nationality of Mr Eind.
36  This, according to the 
Court, is due to the fact, firstly, that the basis for requiring such a right is not laid 
down, expressly or by implication, in any provision of Community law relating to the 
right of residence of third-country national family members of Community migrant 
workers;
37 and, secondly, such a requirement would run counter to the objectives of 
the  Community  legislature,  which  has  recognised  the  profound  importance  of 
ensuring protection for the family life of nationals of the Member States in order to 
eliminate obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty.
38  
                                                 
35   Eind, n 7 supra, para 32. 
36   Ibid para 41. 
37  Ibid para 43. 
38   Ibid para 44.   9 
(ii)  Metock and Sahin 
The Court in July 2008 delivered its judgment in Metock applying the accelerated 
procedure for which provision is made in Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of 
Justice.  The judgment is more like a ruling of principle as in its reasoning the Court 
does not make reference to the actual facts of the cases from which the questions 
arose.  As will be seen, the Court, in effect, repeated the reasoning (with some further 
clarifications) it had followed in Eind, thus cementing the „liberal approach‟ to the 
grant of family reunification rights.  
 
The reference was made in the course of four applications for judicial review before 
the Irish High Court, each seeking an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the 
Irish Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform refusing to grant a residence card 
to a national of a non-member country married to a Union citizen residing in Ireland.  
The  facts  of  each  of  the  cases  involved  a  migrant  Union  citizen  who  held  the 
nationality of another Member State and had moved to Ireland from that State and 
their  third-country  national  spouse  who  had  applied  to  the  Irish  authorities  for  a 
residence card.  A common element in all cases was that the third-country-national 
spouse had not lawfully resided in the territory of another Member State prior to 
moving to Ireland and the marriage of the couple took place in Ireland after the third-
country-national entered the territory of that State.  In all cases, the residence card was 
refused on the ground that the (third-country-national) applicants did not satisfy the 
condition  of  prior  lawful  residence  in  another  Member  State  required  by  Irish 
legislation.  The two main questions referred were: a) whether Directive 2004/38
39 
precludes legislation of a Member State which requires a  national of a non-member 
country who is the spouse of a Union citizen residing in that Member State but not 
possessing  its  nationality  to  have  previously  been  lawfully  resident  in  another 
Member State before arriving in the host Member State, in order to b enefit from the 
provisions of that Directive; and, b) whether the spouse of a Union citizen who has 
exercised his right of freedom of movement by becoming established in a Member 
State whose nationality he does not posses accompanies or joins that citizen  within 
the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/38, and consequently benefits from the 
provisions of that Directive, irrespective of when and where the marriage took place 
and of the circumstances in which he entered the host Member State. 
 
As  regards  the  first  question,  the  Court  replied  that  Directive  2004/38  precludes 
legislation of a Member State which requires a national of a non-member country who 
is the spouse of a Union citizen residing in that Member State but not possessing its 
nationality to have previously been lawfully resident in another Member State before 
arriving in the host Member State, in order to benefit from the provisions of that 
Directive.  It began its analysis by stating that no provision of the 2004 Directive 
makes  the  application  of  that  piece  of  legislation  conditional  on  their  having 
previously resided in a Member State
40 and subsequently cited some of the provisions 
of the Directive to support this statement.
41  It noted, in particular, that the Court‟s 
previous  pronouncement  in  Akrich  that,  in  order  to  benefit  from  the  family 
reunification rights provided in secondary Community legislation, the national of a 
non-member country must be lawfully resident in a Member State when he moves to 
                                                 
39   N 6 supra. 
40   Metock n 8 supra, para 49. 
41   Ibid paras 50-54.   10 
another  Member  State  to  which  the  citizen  of  the  Union  is  migrating,  „must  be 
reconsidered‟.
42  The Court further pointed out that this interpretation is consistent 
with the division of competences between the Member States and the Community .
43 
Since the Community has competence to bring about freedom of movement for Union 
citizens
44 and since „if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in 
the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty 
would be seriously obstructed‟,
45 this, according to the Court, means that it is within 
the competence conferred on the Community legislature to „regulate the conditions of 
entry and residence of the family members of a Union citizen in the territory of the 
Member  States,  where  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  Union  citizen  to  be 
accompanied or joined by his family in the host Member State would be such as to 
interfere with  his  freedom  of movement  by discouraging him from  exercising his 
rights of entry into and residence in that Member State‟.
46  The Court, then, noted that 
„the refusal of the host Member State to grant rights of entry and residence to the 
family members of a Union citizen is such as to discourage that citizen from moving 
to  or  residing  in  that  Member  State,  even  if  his  family  members  are  not  already 
lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State‟.
47 
 
As regards the second question, the Court replied that „the words “family members [of 
Union citizens] who accompany ... them” in Article 3(1) of that directive must be 
interpreted as referring both to the family members of a Union citizen who entered the 
host Member State with him and to those who reside with him in that Member State, 
without it being necessary, in the latter case, to distinguish according to whether the 
nationals  of  non-member  countries  entered  that  Member  State  before  or  after  the 
Union citizen or before or after becoming his family members‟.
48  According to the 
Court,  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  „[w]here  a  Union  citizen  founds  a  family  after 
becoming established in the host Member State, the refusal of that Member State to 
authorise his family members who are nationals of non-member countries to join him 
there  would  be  such  as  to  discourage  him  from  continuing  to  reside  there  and 
encourage him to leave in order to be able to lead a family life in another Member 
State or in a non-member country‟.
49  
 
                                                 
42   Ibid para 58. 
43   Ibid para 60. 
44   Ibid. 
45   Ibid para 62. 
46   Ibid para 63. 
47   Ibid  para  64.    It  is,  also,  quite  interesting  to  note  that  the  Court  itself  argued  that  the 
requirement of prior lawful residence for family members of migrant Union citizens would 
lead  to  reverse  discrimination  against  Union  citizens  when  compared  to  third-country-
nationals falling within the scope of Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification, 
[2003] OJ L251/12, since that piece of legislation requires Member States „to authorise the 
entry and residence of the spouse of a national of a non-member country lawfully resident in 
its territory where the spouse is not already lawfully resident in another Member State‟ (para. 
69 of Metock). 
48   Metock , ibid, para 93. 
49   Ibid para 89.     11 
The (even more recent) Sahin case involved facts which were very similar to those in 
the Metock cases.
50  There, the applicant – Mr Sahin - was a Turkish national who was 
refused by the Austrian authorities a permanent residence card on the ground that he 
did not derive from EC law the right to accompany his German wife in Austria.  This 
was, mainly, because Mr Sahin‟s wife had exercised her right to free movement (from 
Germany to Austria) at a time when Mr Sahin was already residing in Austria and 
thus, in effect, Mr Sahin was not joining or accompanying a migrant Union citizen in 
the host State when he moved to Austria; and Mr Sahin and his wife got married in 
2006, i.e. three years after Mr Sahin and two years after his wife, entered Austria 
(therefore, Mr Sahin acquired the status of family member under EC law only at that 
time and, thus, after he moved to Austria).  In its Order, the Court in effect copied and 
pasted  its  reasoning  from  Metock  and  replied  that  Directive  2004/38  must  be 
interpreted as applying also to family members who arrived in the host Member State 
independently  of  the  Union  citizen  and  acquired  the  status  of  family  member  or 
started to lead a family life with that Union citizen only after arriving in that State.     
 
(iii)  Eind, Metock, Sahin  and the „liberal approach‟ 
 
It is my thesis that both of the most recent judgments of the Court - Eind and Metock 
–  on  family  reunification  rights  arising  as  a  result  of  the  exercise  of  one  of  the 
fundamental freedoms, as well as the Order of the Court which merely replicated the 
Court‟s judgment in Metock (Sahin), fall squarely within the „liberal approach‟. 
 
In the first of these cases - Eind - the Court seems to have been determined to clarify a 
number  of  outstanding  issues,  the  most  important  ones  being  whether  the  Akrich 
condition should be applied as a general condition in family reunification cases; and, 
more implicitly, which interpretation of Singh should prevail.   
 
In its written observations in Eind, the Netherlands government emphasised that Mr 
Eind could not have been deterred from exercising his freedom to move to the UK in 
order to take up gainful employment, by the fact that it would be impossible for his 
daughter to reside with him once he returned to his Member State of origin, „given 
that at the time of the initial move Miss Eind did not have a right to reside in the 
Netherlands‟.
51   
 
In reply to that point, the Court noted  that that approach cannot be accepted and, as 
already seen, making use of the „deterrence principle‟ and applying reasoning akin to 
„Interpretation I‟ of Singh,
52 it pointed out that Mr Eind‟s right to exercise his initial 
                                                 
50   The only difference of substance is that Mr Sahin enjoyed a temporary right of residence in 
Austria under the laws on asylum.  However, since this is not important for our purposes, it 
will not be discussed further on the main text. 
51   Eind n 7 supra, para 33. 
52   In his Opinion in the Eind case, ibid, Advocate General Mengozzi also adopted „Interpretation 
I‟ of Singh - see, in particular, para 97 of the Opinion.  It should be noted that although the 
Advocate General applied the „deterrence principle‟ in the same way as the Court (see paras. 
101-103 of the Opinion), nonetheless he complemented his reasoning by looking at alternative 
ways for bringing the situation within the scope of EC law: (a) he examined whether Rachel 
could derive from EC law a right of residence in the Netherlands as a family member of a job-
seeker;  and  (b)  he  enquired  whether  Rachel  could,  in  the  alternative,  derive  a  right  of   12 
movement from the Netherlands to the UK as a worker, would have been deterred as a 
result of the refusal of the Netherlands to grant a right of residence to Rachel.  As 
regards, in particular, the Akrich condition of prior lawful residence in the territory of 
a Member State, the Court observed, somewhat ambiguously, that the fact that Rachel 
was not lawfully resident in the territory of the Netherlands prior to moving to the 
UK, does not affect the finding that Mr Eind would be deterred from moving from the 
Netherlands to the UK in case the former State refused to grant Rachel a right of 
residence  on  his  return.
53  This appears to have been  a subtle affirmation  of the 
principle established in  Jia, that the application of the „Akrich condition‟ should be 
confined to cases involving facts similar to Akrich.
54  
 
Moreover, in practical terms, the facts in  Eind do not appear to involve a sufficient 
link with EC law.  More specifically, there does not seem to be any link between the 
exercise by Mr Eind of his right under Article 39 EC to move from his home State to 
the UK to work, and the refusal of the Netherlands to grant his daughter a right to 
reside in its territory on his return from the UK.  In other words, the refusal of the 
Dutch authorities to grant Rachel a residence permit did not come as a result of Mr 
Eind‟s  movement  to  the  UK.    Rachel  did  not  enjoy  a  right  of  residence  in  the 
Netherlands  before  Mr  Eind  exercised  his  freedom  of  movement  to  the  UK  and, 
similarly,  on  Mr  Eind‟s  return  to  the  Netherlands,  the  Dutch  authorities  applying 
Dutch law, did not grant her a right of residence.  Hence, the exercise by Mr Eind of 
his right to move to another Member State to work could not have been deterred as a 
result of the Dutch authorities‟ refusal to grant his daughter a residence permit in the 
Netherlands.   
 
To  dispel  any  remaining  doubts  following  Eind,  the  Court  in  Metock  made  it 
absolutely clear that not only is it not required that the Akrich condition is satisfied in 
order for family reunification rights to arise as a matter of EC law but, moreover, the 
imposition  of  such  a  condition  of  prior  lawful  residence  by  the  legislation  of  a 
Member State is in violation of EC law and, in particular, the 2004 Directive.
55  This 
was  also  affirmed  in  the  Court‟s  Order  in  Sahin.  Moreover,  Metock  and  Sahin 
provided the further clarification that even if the third-country-national applicant for a 
residence permit has become a family member of the migrant Union citizen (i.e. the 
„sponsor‟ of the rights) after he entered the territory of the host State, he still can 
qualify for a derived right of residence as a family member of the migrant.   
                                                                                                                                            
residence in the Netherlands as a family member of a migrant Union citizen falling within the 
scope of Article 18 EC read in conjunction with Directive 90/364 on the right of residence, 
[1990] OJ L180/26.  Perhaps the Advocate General was suspecting that the Court might prefer 
to apply its „moderate approach‟ in the case and require a real link between the refusal of the 
grant of family reunification rights and the exercise of an inter-state economic activity and, 
therefore, in such an instance, the free movement of workers provisions and the „deterrence 
principle‟ would be of no use to the Einds. 
53   Eind, ibid, paras. 41-44. 
54   This is more directly expressed in the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi in  Eind, ibid, 
paras. 42-46. 
55   It is not clear whether the imposition of such a condition of prior lawful residence would, also, 
violate primary legislation (e.g. Article 39 EC) applied to situations which do not fall within 
the scope of Directive 2004/38 (n 6  supra), i.e. situations which fall within the scope of the 
Treaty provisions on the free movement of persons but which do not fall within the scope of 
Directive 2004/38 because they do not involve a Union citizen moving to a Member State 
other than that of his nationality (see Article 3(1) of the 2004 Directive).   13 
When applying these principles to the facts of the cases from which the questions 
referred arose, it can be seen that the Court appears to have totally abandoned the 
requirement of the existence of a link between the exercise of one of the fundamental 
freedoms and the grant of family reunification rights to the Union citizen who has 
exercised that fundamental freedom.  On the facts of all these cases (ie the Metock 
group of cases and Sahin), it was obvious that the loss of the right to be with (certain) 
family  members  was  not  in  any  way  related  to  the  exercise  of  the  freedom  of 
movement of workers under Article 39 EC by the spouses of the applicants.  The 
Union citizens who were the family members of the applicants did not enjoy a right of 
being with their family members in the State from which they came, simply because 
the applicants became members of the family of the migrant „sponsor‟ only once the 
latter  moved  to  the  territory  of  the  host  State.  And  even  if  the  applicants  were, 
already, members of the family of the migrant Union citizens at the time of the latters‟ 
move to the host State, still, a sufficient link with the exercise of movement as a 
worker would not be established since in all cases the right to be with their third-
country-national  spouses  was  not  lost  as  a  result  of  the  exercise  of  the  relevant 
fundamental freedom, precisely because such as a right was not enjoyed in the first 
place.  Hence, like in all the other „liberal approach‟ cases, the Court seems to have 
been satisfied that the situations fell within the scope of EC law and, in particular, the 
free movement of workers provisions and Directive 2004/38, merely because they 
involved  a  Member  State  national  who  had  exercised  one  of  the  fundamental 
freedoms and the (third-country-national) applicants fell within one of the groups of 
family members (i.e. spouses) that automatically enjoy the right under EC law to 
accompany their spouses in the host State. 
 
Finally, if, following Eind, „Interpretation I‟ of Singh is now adopted, this will mean 
that Singh can be added to the „liberal approach‟ group, thus reinforcing the view 
(implicitly) held by the Court in Jia and Carpenter and, more recently, Eind, Metock 
and Sahin that, provided that some kind of inter-state movement has taken place, 
family reunification rights must be granted, even if their refusal would have in no way 
deterred the exercise of that movement.  Accordingly, since the most recent cases of 
the Court on the issue of the bestowal of family reunification rights  fall squarely 
within  the  „liberal  approach‟,  it  seems  that  we  are  witnessing  a  move  towards  a 
complete adoption of that approach.  As will be seen in the subsequent part of this 
paper, the Court may have not been entirely unjustified in adopting this more flexible 
approach.  In other words, the fact that the Court may now be eager to make family 
reunification rights (as part of the right to family life) more widely available, may be 
due to the need to ensure that some new (non-economic) objectives of the Community 
are furthered.
56  And it is to the explanation of this that we now turn.   
  
 
III.  THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE MOVE TOWARDS THE 
‘LIBERAL APPROACH’   
As it is undoubtedly well-known, the immediate aim of the drafters of the E(E)C 
Treaty back in the late 1950s was the creation of a common market.  Therefore, when 
the Community legislature in the 1960s and early 1970s made provision for the grant 
of  family  reunification  rights  to  migrant  economic  actors,  it  was  acting  as  an 
                                                 
56   For another commentator advocating this view see G. Barrett, n 10 supra, at 419.   14 
institution of an economic organisation that viewed Member State nationals merely as 
instruments to be used in promoting its economic objectives.  Accordingly, back then, 
Community  legislation  bestowed  family  reunification  rights  solely  in  order  to 
encourage Member State nationals to move between Member States and exercise one 
of the (economic) fundamental freedoms, furthering in that way the Community‟s 
economic aims.
57   
 
However, it appears that, latterly, the Court of Justice is making its first tentative steps 
towards articulating a new aim for the Community.
58  This new aim is the creation of 
a  meaningful  status  of  Union  citizenship:  a  status  which,  following  the  recent 
pronouncements of the Court on the issue, does, indeed, appear to be a „source of 
rights‟
59 for Union citizens.




(to name but a few) illustrate how in the EU of today rights can be derived from the 
EC Treaty by Member State nationals (now Union citizens), even in situations which 
do  not  involve  any  kind  of  contribution  to  the  economic  aim  of  the  Treaty  of 
establishing and maintaining a single market.
64  Such rights include the rights of free 
movement,  residence,  and  non-discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  nationality .
65  
However, it would seem that a meaningful notion of citizenship, such as the one that 
the Court of Justice appears to be wishing to construct , requires the EC to  include 
some other basic rights in the list of rights that must now be made available to Union 
citizens.  In particular, fundamental human  rights,  such as those enlisted i n the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), are obvious candidates for inclusion 
within this list.  Having in mind that some of the rights that have traditionally been 
granted to migrant economic actors have been extended to all Union citizens who can 
point to a link with EC law, there does not seem to be a valid reason for not extending 
other rights (such as traditional human rights) that have already been granted by EC 
law to migrant economic actors, to all Union citizens falling within the Community‟s 
ambit.   
 
The central argument of this paper is that the real purpose of the Court in the „liberal 





70 may have simply 
been  to  protect  the  (human)  right  to  family  life  (of  which  the  right  to  family 
                                                 
57   See para. 69 of Advocate General Geelhoed‟s Opinion in Jia, n 4 supra; G. Barrett ibid at 
375-376.   
58   See A. Tryfonidou, n 28 supra, at 55. 
59   S. Besson and A. Utzinger, „Introduction: Future Challenges of European Citizenship - Facing 
a Wide-Open Pandora‟s Box‟, (2007) 13(5) European Law Journal 573, at 579. 
60   N. Reich and S. Harbacevica, n 24 supra, at 617. 
61   Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-269 
62   Case C-456/02, Trojani v Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles [2004] ECR I-7573. 
63   Case C-209/03, R (ex parte Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119 
64   For an explanation see A. Tryfonidou, n 28 supra, at 55-60. 
65   N. Foster, n 25 supra, at 295. 
66   N 3 supra. 
67   N 4 supra. 
68   N 7 supra. 
69   N 8 supra. 
70   N 9 supra.   15 
reunification is an aspect), of the Union citizens involved.  All these cases involved 
moving  Union  citizens,  Union  citizens  who  had  exercised  one  of  the  (economic) 
fundamental freedoms, the situation of which, however, did not present any real link 
with the economic aims of those freedoms.  Accordingly, the real underlying aim of 
the Court in those cases may not have been to protect the economic fundamental 
freedoms of the claimants, but rather, to ensure that their right to respect for family 
life would not be arbitrarily limited by Member States.
71   
 
Hence, perhaps deciding to follow the suggestion of Advocate General Jacobs in the 
Konstantinidis case,
72 the Court may be diffidently moving towards developing a new 
principle according to which all moving Union citizens must have their human rights 
respected as a matter of EC law.
73  And it appears that in the Court‟s view, the kind of 
movement involved is not significant and thus, even those who move back to their 
State of nationality (such as Mr Eind) and those who exercise merely temporary short-
term movements to other Member States (such as Mr Carpenter), can rely on EC law 
for  requiring  Member  States  (including  their  own  Member  State)  to  respect  their 
human rights.  This development does not seem to be such a surprising step to take, in 
view of the fact that human rights considerations now deeply inform the choices of 




IV.  THE PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S LIBERAL 
APPROACH 
 
Yet, despite the attractiveness of this solution which adds an extra layer of human 
rights protection for (some) Union citizens, we immediately have to confront two - 
not easily solvable - problems.   
 
The first problem is the aggravation of the problem of reverse discrimination.  As 
already briefly mentioned, the application of the purely internal rule which excludes 
from the scope of the Community‟s fundamental freedoms any situations that do not 
involve a link with EC law, often leads to the emergence of reverse discrimination.  
This difference in treatment affects a number of areas of everyday life since it may 
relate  to  a  variety  of  matters  such  as  conditions  of  employment,
75  qualifying 
requirements  for  a  profession,
76  and,  more  importantly  for  our  purposes,  the 
                                                 
71   The importance attached by the Court in ensuring the protection of the family life of nationals 
of the Member States who have exercised one of the fundamental freedoms can be seen in 
most of the Court‟s case-law on family reunification rights, especially the most recent cases – 
see, for instance, Metock, n 8 supra, para 56; Eind, n 7 supra, para 44; Carpenter, n 3 supra, 
para 38; MRAX, n 27 supra, para 53. 
72   Case  C-168/91,  Konstantinidis  v  Stadt  Altensteig,  Standesamt,  and  Landratsamt  Calw, 
Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-1191, para 46. 
73   For a similar view see C. Schiltz, n 20 supra, at 251-252.   
74   See, for example, the recent Family Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86, n 47  supra), 
para 2 of the Preamble; Directive 2004/38, n 6 supra, para 31 of the Preamble. 
75   Case C-332/90, Steen v Deutsche Bundespost [1992] ECR I-341. 
76   Joined Cases C-29/94, C-30/94, C-31/94, C-32/94, C-33/94, C-34/94 and C-35/94, Criminal 
proceedings against Aubertin and others [1995] ECR I-301.   16 
availability of human rights
77 and, in particular,  family reunification rights.
78  The 
Court seems to have been aware of the invidious  results arising from this and, by 
following a more flexible approach in cases such as Carpenter
79 and Eind,
80 may have 
been aiming at preventing the emergence of reverse discrimination, at least in the 
context of family reunification rights.  Indeed, the fact that it is now overly easy for a 
situation to be included within the scope of EC law means that, in arithmetic terms, 
much fewer instances of reverse discrimination will emerge.  Yet, this does not solve 
the  reverse  discrimination  conundrum  in  its  entirety  and,  in  reality,  the  new  way 
employed in the „liberal group‟ cases for determining which situations must qualify 
for  EC  protection,  seems  to  be  worsening  the  injustice  caused  as  a  result  of  the 
application of the purely internal rule.
81   
 
Since the Court may have decided to extend EC human rights protection to all moving 
Union citizens (or, following Chen,
82 Garcia Avello,
83 and Schempp,
84 it could be 
suggested that this would be extended  to all Union citizens who  can point to a link 
with more than one Member State), it is obvious that Union citizens who fail to satisfy 
those linking requirements will continue to be excluded from that protection.
85  This 
situation, however, is o n a collision  course with the deeply embedded view  that 
human rights are rights that must be granted to  all  human  beings,  without  any 
unjustifiable distinctions being made.  At a time when the Community‟s (economic) 
fundamental freedoms were interpreted as including within their scope only situations 
that had a real link with their aim of establishing an internal market, it appeared to be 
justified to exclude from their scope any situations that did not present a link with that 
aim.  Nonetheless, since, in a number of cases, the Court has included within the 
scope of the free movement of economic actors provisions situations that do not, in 
reality, present a link with their economic aims, the emerging difference in treatment 
between situations that fall within the scope of EC law (despite the fact that they only 
involve an artificial link with the aim of those provisions) and situations that continue 
to be excluded, appears to be entirely unjustified, since it is not based on the rational 
criterion of including within the scope of those provisions only situations that involve 
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a true link to their aim.
86  The same can be argued in relation to the way that the scope 
of application of the EC T reaty‟s  Citizenship  provisions  has  been  drawn  and,  in 
particular,  in  relation  to  the  acceptance  in  Chen  that  the  mere  possession  of  the 
nationality of one Member State whilst residing in the territory of another, can bring a 
Union citizen within the scope of EC law.
87  Although a case involving this more lax 
linking factor and the application of EC human rights protection has not, yet, arisen, 
nonetheless, it is not difficult to perceive that there does not appear to be a rational 
justification for requiring, as  a matter of EC  law, a Member State to  respect  and 
protect the human rights of a Union citizen who happens to satisfy that link, whilst not 
having a similar obligation towards a Union citizen who fails to do so.  
 
The fact that some Union citizens, without a valid justification, are excluded from the 
human  rights  protection  that  is  made  available  by  EC  law,  will  surely  present 
problems  in  a  polity  which  aspires  to  create  a  meaningful  notion  of  Union 
citizenship.
88  If the Court will   expressly pronounce the principle that this auth or 
suspects has formed the ratio nale  behind  the  Court‟s  „liberal  approach‟  in  family 
reunification judgments (ie that all moving Union citizens must, as a matter of EC 
law, have their human rights respected), it is highly probable that Union citizens who 
will be unable to benefit from that principle because their situation (quite arbitrarily) 
qualifies as purely internal to a Member State, will challenge it as being contrary to 
EC law.  The argument will be that reverse discrimination is an unjustified difference 
in treatment
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The second difficulty arising from the Court‟s „liberal approach‟ and its underlying 
objective of extending the availability of human rights to all Union citizens who can 
point to a link with more than one Member State, has to do with the possibility of 
carrying forward that approach in the near future and, more specifically, once the 
important constitutional developments that are in the EU‟s doorstep will take effect.   
 
Through  its  case-law,  the  Court  of  Justice  has  required,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
Community institutions, and, on the other hand, the Member States when acting as 
agents  of  the  Community
91  and  when  derogating  from  Community  law 
requirements,
92 to respect the human rights of Member State nationals, provided that 
their situation falls  within the  scope of EC law.
93  However, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights,
94 which will become binding once and if  the Lisbon Reform 
Treaty is ratified by all Member States,
95  may  have  the  effect  of  restricting  the 
circumstances under which Member States are bound by human rights guarantees, as 
a matter of EC law.  This is because Article 51(1) of the Charter provides that „[t]he 
provisions  of  this  Charter  are  addressed  to  the  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and 
agencies of the Union [...] and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union  law‟.
96  The lack of clarity in th e  Court‟s  case-law  as  to  what  constitutes 
„implementation  of  EC  law‟  means  that  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  Charter  will 
consolidate the Court‟s case-law and apply, inter alia, to situations involving Member 
States acting „within the scope of application‟ of Community law (including situations 
involving Member States derogating from EC law (ERT-type situations)); or whether 
the drafters of the Charter intended to adopt a more restrictive approach than the one 
currently  employed  by  the  Court  and  limit  the  Charter‟s  scope  of  application  to 
agency, Wachauf-type, situations which involve implementation stricto sensu.
97  The 
latter would allow within the scope of the Charter only situations involving a Member 
State applying a Community measure   (eg a Community Regulation)   or  applying 
national legislation which has been drafted in order to implement into national law a 
piece of Community secondary legislation.
98    
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In case Article 51(1) of the Charter is interpreted in the latter, restrictive way, this will 
make  it  highly  questionable  whether  the  Court  will  be  able  to  carry  forward  the 
principle that all Union citizens whose situation presents a link with more than one 
Member State, are entitled to EC human rights protection.  This is because, as a result 
of this restrictive interpretation of Article 51(1), whenever a situation does not involve 
a  Member  State  applying  a  Community  legislative  measure  or  applying  national 
legislation  which  transposes  EC  legislation  into  national  law,  the  Union  citizen 
involved will not be able to rely on the Charter to challenge the way in which that 
Member State acts.  In other words, if that interpretation prevails, only Union citizens 
who can point to a link with EC law and whose situation involves a Member State 
implementing EC law in either of the two ways provided above, will be able to rely 
on the Charter.   
 
The area of family reunification rights provides the perfect example for illustrating the 
problems arising from the above restrictive interpretation of the Charter.  In some of 
the family reunification cases that we saw in this piece (Singh,
99 Carpenter, Akrich
100 
and Eind), it is clear that the contested actions in no way involved Member States 
„implementing  Union  law‟.  This  was  because  the  facts  of  those  cases  involved 
Member State nationals who wished to be accompanied by their family members in 
their Member State of nationality, and the EC secondary legislation instruments that 
governed, inter alia, the conditions for the grant and restriction of family reunification 
rights at the time,
101 only covered situations which involved Member State nationals 
who wished to be joined by their family members in Member States other than that of 
their  nationality.  This  legislative  lacuna  seems  to  persist,  even  following  the 
enactment  of  Directive  2004/38
102  which is, now, the sole   Community legislative 
instrument that governs the grant of family reunification rights to Union citizens, and 
which provides in Article 3 that it applies to all Union citizens who move to, or reside 
in, a Member State other than that of which they are a national.  Hence, since there is 
no piece of secondary legislation which governs the grant and restriction of the rights 
of family reunification of Union citizens wishing to rely on those rights against their 
State of nationality (eg Carpenter), it appears that in such cases, the Charter will not 
be applicable.  Conversely, in situations involving a Union citizen who wishes to be 
accompanied by his family members in another Member State (eg Jia, Metock and 
Sahin)
103 the Charter may be applicable, since when the host Member State will be 
applying  the  conditions  for  the  grant  of,  or  when  restricting,  rights  to  family 
reunification of Union citizens in its territory, it will be applying national legislation 
which was drafted in order to implement Directive 2004/38.   
                                                                                                                                            
and which is capable of actually broadening the scope of application of the Charter (and, in 
general, EU human rights protection) as regards acts of the Member States: „the requirement 
to respect fundamental rights defined in a Union context is only binding on the Member States 
when they act in the context of Community law‟ (emphasis added) – See „Explanations relating 
to  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union‟,  CONVENT  49,  Charte 
4473/00, at p. 46. 
99   N 15 supra. 
100   N 2 supra. 
101     Regulation 1612/68, n 34 supra; and Directive 73/148 Directive on the abolition of restrictions 
on  movement  and  residence  within  the  Community  for  nationals  of  Member  States  with 
regard to establishment and the provision of services, [1973] OJ L172/14. 
102   N 6 supra. 
103   N 4 supra; N 8 supra and N 9 supra, respectively.   20 
This will, obviously, create another unjustifiable division as regards the availability of 
EC human rights protection, this time, however, the division will be between two 
categories of persons, both of which are comprised of Union citizens that fall within 
the scope of EC  law.  In the same way that  reverse discrimination  regarding the 
respect and protection of human rights is, in the light of recent developments, no 
longer a justified difference in treatment, the difference in treatment in this context, 
likewise, does not appear to be based on any justifiable ground.  The mere fact that 
someone‟s situation happens to involve the implementation by a Member State of EC 
law,  does  not  appear  to  be  a  rational  ground  on  which  to  determine  whether  the 
Member State has to protect and respect human rights as enlisted on the Charter, or 
whether the Charter will be inapplicable.
104   
 
This issue is not merely of academic interest  since the transformation of the Charter 
into a binding document will bolster the position of „the family‟ in the EU, by making 
it an institution worthy of special measures of protection.  This is obvious from the 
fact that the Charter does not only include a classic provision (Article 7) enshrining 
the right to respect for family life, but also provides, in Article 33(1), that the family 
shall enjoy legal, economic and social protection.  This latter provision is extremely 
important, especially in family reunification cases, since it illustrates that the Charter 
recognises that „the family‟ in the EU has to be protected in its own right, and not 
only  in  the  process  of  achieving  other  goals  whether  economic  (such  as  the 
establishment of the internal market) or not.
105  Accordingly, it remains to be seen 
how Article 51(1) of the Charter will be interpreted, and how far, if at all, this will 
enable the Community‟s human rights „competence‟ to continue encroaching upon 
Member State sovereignty in the delicate area of immigration control.   
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This  article  has  taken  us  through  a  journey  over  time  in  the  Court‟s  family 
reunification rights jurisprudence.  The aim of the author has been to revisit a cluster 
of well-known cases in the area spanning over a period of thirty years, and, with the 




108 cases, provide a critical reassessment of the Court‟s reasoning in those 
cases.  As has been explained, the Court in its recent case-law exhibits a tendency of 
following a more liberal approach towards the grant of family reunification rights, by 
bestowing such rights on moving Union citizens even where, in reality, there is no 
link between the need to grant those rights and the aim(s) of the EC provisions from 
which those rights are derived on the specific facts of the case.  It has been suggested 
that the rationale behind this may have been the desire of the Court to protect the 
(human) right to family life of the Union citizens involved in the case; and that this 
may be part of a broader move  towards developing a new principle  according  to 
which all moving Union citizens must have their human rights respected as a matter of 
EC law.  Yet, and despite the attractiveness of this development, it has been argued 
that the application of this new principle will not be problem-free.  On the one hand, it 
will aggravate the problem of reverse discrimination regarding the availability of EC 
human rights protection since, whilst it will reduce the number of instances of reverse 
discrimination, the cases of reverse discrimination that will continue to arise will be 
even more difficult to justify in view of the fact that the way that the scope of EC law 
is delimited under this new principle does not appear to be „reasonable‟, in the sense 
of  corresponding  to  one  of  the  aims  of  the  Community.    On  the  other  hand,  the 
feasibility of this new approach in light of the possibility of the Treaty of Lisbon 
coming into force and its effect of making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
binding, appears to be questionable, since the scope of application of the Charter is 
obviously narrower than the scope of application of EC human rights protection under 
this new principle and, in fact, may even be narrower than the current scope of EC 
human rights protection as developed in the Court‟s case-law.  In any event, if the 
Court, despite the above concerns, wishes to continue applying this new principle 
requiring Member States to respect the human rights of all moving Union citizens, in 
the interests of legal certainty it should do so explicitly. 
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